

Bachelor Thesis in Peace and Development

What makes nonviolent

resistance movements

successful?



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Abstract

Social uprisings that attempt to achieve social change through nonviolent methods are not a new phenomenon, but researchers have so far not been able to determine the factors that lead to their success. This study engages in that debate by looking at three ongoing cases of nonviolent resistance movements, in Sudan, Myanmar, and Lebanon, and applying the lens of Erica Chenoweth's framework, as that is the most recent work on the topic. While the results show that factors she presented as core elements for success, such as participation numbers and the use of mixed methods, are important to further achieve defection and resilience, the results also underline the importance of international support, the history of nonviolent movements and particularly geopolitics for nonviolent resistance movements to achieve their goals. The conclusions point at the imperative for future research to further examine and develop inclusive models for nonviolent resistance movements that can bring peaceful transformation and development, while also emphasizing the significance of international support to assist in the success of nonviolent resistance movements.

Keywords: nonviolence, resistance, movements, success, development

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List of Abbreviations

AAPP	Assistance Association for Political Prisoners
AU	African Union
ASEAN	The Association of Southeast Asian Nations
CDM	Civil Disobedience Movement
EU	European Union
FFC	Forces of Freedom and Change
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
IDP	Internally Displaced People
IMF	International Monetary Fund
LAS	League of Arab States
MNC	Multinational Corporations
NCP	National Congress Party
NLD	National League for Democracy
NUG	National Unity Government
OHCHR	UN Human Rights Office
PDF	People's Defense Forces
PM	Prime Minister
RSF	Rapid Support Forces
SPA	Sudanese Professional Association
ТМС	Transitional Military Council
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
US	United States

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1. Introduction

1.1. Introduction, Research Problem, and Relevance

Nonviolence is not a new phenomenon and has long been used by civilians across the world, there have been an array of waves of nonviolent civil movements. One started in Paris in 1968 and moved across the globe to Prague, Madrid, Mexico City, Chicago, and London. Another wave swept in during the late 1980s that would subsequently bring down the Berlin wall. At the beginning of 2000, the world saw the rise of the color revolutions, which was later followed by the Arab Spring in 2011. Yet again in 2019, the world saw a new wave of nonviolent civil movements taking place around the world from Paris to Haiti, the USA, Hong Kong, Bogota, Catalonia, Teheran, India, London, and so forth (Wanlund, 2020).

Within the academic world, there is an emphasis on researching violence rather than nonviolence. Although researchers are looking into the topic of nonviolence, the only real guru we have today on the topic, that is making an effort to bring out the pros and cons is Erica Chenoweth. In 2008, Chenoweth and Maria J. Stephan collected data from every country in the world between 1900-2006 that had experienced some kind of mass mobilization, both violent and non-violent. They further researched nonviolent resistance, and how nonviolent campaigns and methods are capable of constraining the options for authoritarian regimes, by building massive support from below and then disrupting the pillars of support upon whose power those opponents rely. Chenoweth and Stephan concluded that nonviolence is a more successful strategy for social change, as opposed to violence (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011). However, Chenoweth has revised her previous statements. Therefore, it is imperative for researchers to critically question her framework, especially, since it is so important for the future of democracy and human and international development.

Furthermore, recent cases of nonviolent resistance movements have been burdened with repression and a lack of success, so the question of what would make them successful is a question that is of the utmost importance. While conflict is unavoidable and can be either destructive or constructive depending on how they are conducted, it does lead to change in one way or another. Now, based on the fact that social movements are a human right, and that bottom-up approaches for change are better than imposed top-down approaches, nonviolent resistance movements should be strongly supported for democratic change and human

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development. Ackermann and Merriman (2019) emphasize the importance of supporting nonviolent resistance movements and enhancing the possibility for the international community to assist through their framework, the Right to Assist which is an alternative to the doctrine of the Responsibility to Protect which was developed to prevent mass atrocities. However, this doctrine has shown to be interventionist and to neglect the will of the people and the power of civil resistance (Ackermann & Merriman, 2019). Social change often occurs through violence, so in the pursuit of lowering violent conflicts globally and enhancing the prosperity for constructive social and human development, it is imperative to further inquire into the conditions that make nonviolent movements succeed or fail, we, therefore, need to have more inclusive and flexible models for success, hence, more research is needed within the topic of nonviolent resistance movements.

1.2. Research Objective and Research Questions

This thesis contributes to the vital discussion about the conditions and factors that make nonviolent resistance movements either bound to fail or achieve success by critically assessing the lens of Chenoweth's framework when applied to Sudan, Myanmar, and Lebanon.

This leads us to the research questions, which are as follows;

How did the nonviolent resistance movements develop in each case study?

How do the movements in the three countries compare in terms of Chenoweth's factors of success or failure?

What are the strengths and weaknesses of Chenoweth's model and how can we move towards a more inclusive model?

2. Literature Review

Just as the use of nonviolence is not new, neither is the research on nonviolence. Within the broader field of peace studies, a trajectory of theorists and leaders who are proponents of nonviolence can be mapped out and discussed in terms of how their work has influenced each other over time. One line of questioning that has been studied has been to try to explain what factors are detrimental for nonviolent resistance movements to either succeed or fail. These attempts to find explanations have often been conducted by researching case studies from past nonviolent resistance movements and have not necessarily brought us closer to an inclusive model for success. There are therefore still many questions left to be answered.

Mohandas K Gandhi, known as Mahatma Gandhi is perhaps the most well-known individual promoting the use and the understanding of nonviolent resistance, which he called Satyagraha. One of the first to study and understand Gandhi's legacy was the American Richard Gregg. In his book, *The Power of Nonviolence* (1934) Gregg developed the concept of moral jiu-jitsu where he argued that the moral advantage of nonviolence is so important that it can put opponents off balance. Furthermore, he claimed that police and security forces using violence against nonviolent actors would be appalled by their behavior, hence, emphasizing the power of sympathy and moral values (Gregg, 1934).

During the 1950s and 1960s, the American preacher Martin Luther King became famous as one of the leading figures of the civil rights movement in the United States (US), where he with passion and eloquence expressed his devotion to the strategy of nonviolence to battle racial injustices. King emphasized five factors of nonviolence to bring out success, maintaining resilience, conversion, attacking the evil or injustice, not the "wrong-doer", the principle of love as in goodwill, solidarity, maintaining nonviolent discipline, and finally, a divine belief that truth and justice will triumph. By using this strategy with discipline, wisdom, and courage, King stated that freedom and justice will succeed (King, 1957).

In 1973, Gene Sharp explained how he had been influenced by the work of Gandhi, whose theory of power was based on the notion that the power of a government or ruler is conditional on the obedience, cooperation, and submission of their citizens or subordinates, which with the philosophy of Satyagraha included factors such as a clear goal, conversion, noncooperation, disobedience, and constructive resistance. With further influences from academics such as Gregg and others, Sharp (1973), further developed his own very

noteworthy approach to nonviolent resistance, maintaining that nonviolence is more effective than its counterpart violence. Rather than basing his arguments on the moral imperative not to use violence, he argued that certain conditions are necessary for a nonviolent struggle to succeed. These conditions are complicated and interlinked, and the combinations of conditions may be somewhat different from case to case. Sharp delineated 198 methods of nonviolent actions, however, he did emphasize conversion, accommodation, and coercion. Within these three broader processes, Sharp emphasized the importance of maintaining discipline, the distribution of power, mass action, and what he called 'political jiu-jitsu', which refers to a combination of strategies that aims at creating a backlash or shifts in opinion that causes a chain reaction that will favor the nonviolent resistance movement (Sharp, 1973).

Peter Ackerman & Christopher Kruegler (1994) argued that the international response to human rights abuses inspired the use of nonviolent strategies, outlining twelve factors that they further divided into three broader categories, firstly, development which included factors such as clear goals, mass action, and diverse methods; secondly, engagement where they included e.g maintaining nonviolent discipline and defection; and thirdly, conception where they included factors such as strategy, tactics, and logistics. However, they further stated that these factors can contribute to either failure or success for nonviolent resistance (Ackerman & Kruegler, 1994).

A decade later in 2005, Stellan Vinthagen argued that for the success of nonviolent action it is necessary that the actions taken are understood as reasonable, or at least comprehensible to several factions. Furthermore, broad public support and defection from the opponent are needed. Vinthagen also noted that when linguistics is part of the strategic action, then linguistic communication becomes just as essential as the other factors in the aim of achieving success (Vinthagen, 2005).

Sharon Nepstad Ericson (2011), on the other hand, stated that strategic factors such as maintaining nonviolence, planning, execution, and adapting tactics are essential for the outcome of nonviolent movements. However, Nepstad argues that there is only one factor that truly characterizes triumphant nonviolent resistance movements, that is defection. The regime's loss of power, specifically the loss of support from the military is the factor that will make nonviolent movements succeed (Nepstad, 2011).

Though past research and academic work help us understand factors that have been important in past nonviolent resistance movements, it is really hard to pin down the factors that truly determine success or failure. Furthermore, if a nonviolent movement is not explicitly successful, it is difficult to determine when the movement has finished. Moreover, the only real guiding light today on the topic is Chenoweth, who came out with complete research on the topic in 2011, and a revised version in 2021, but even she had to modify her initial research to adjust to an ever-changing context which left us once again without clear guidance in terms of factors that determine success and failure. It is therefore imperative to further emphasize the research on nonviolent resistance movements to make nonviolent protests a more viable option for social change.

3. Analytical Framework

The leading researcher today within the field of nonviolence, Chenoweth, concluded that violence and nonviolence had been studied from two different perspectives. Chenoweth and Stephan pursued an empirical study that collected data from every country in the world between 1900-2006 that had experienced some kind of mass mobilization, both violent and nonviolent, in the pursuit of maximalist goals; i.e. to overthrow a regime or dictatorship, to gain territorial independence, or for the goal of secession. They ended up examining, comparing, and analyzing 323 cases, which is manifested in *Why Civil Resistance Works* (2011) wherein nonviolence has been concluded to be a more successful strategy for social change, as opposed to violence (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011).

Chenoweth and Stephan's conceptual framework

Chenoweth and Stephan (2011), use civil resistance equivalently to nonviolent resistance movements and defined it as psychological, social, economic, and political methods, such as protests, strikes, boycotts, sit-ins, stay-aways, and other measures of noncooperation to mobilize the people to delegitimize opponents and shake the pillars of power. Furthermore, they characterize violent resistance as the use of violent strategies, such as kidnapping, bombing, and physical sabotage both on people, infrastructure, and property used by nonstate actors (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011). They further follow Ackerman and Kruegler's (1994) definition of a campaign as a series of noticeable and ceaseless tactics that can last for days or years in pursuit of a political objective, campaigns also often have a name and an apparent leadership (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011).

Chenoweth and Stephan argue that to be considered a success, the campaigns had to attain two objectives: first, a complete accomplishment of the stated goals (regime change, anti-occupation, or secession) within a year of the peak activities, and secondly, a palpable effect on the outcomes as a direct result of the activities of the campaign (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011). Moreover, they define participation within a resistance campaign as an active and visible commitment to collective action, where the number of participants is concluded by counting the highest number of participants in the peak events of a campaign. Chenoweth and Stephan (2011) declare that campaigns with maximalist goals have, within the academic literature, typically been linked with violence, whereas nonviolent campaigns have been mostly connected to social and human rights movements. Therefore, they have chosen to use solely these specific and extreme forms of resistance to prove the effectiveness of nonviolent campaigns (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011).

Chenoweth and Stephan's Key Factors for Success

In Chenoweth and Stephan's original research from 2011 they underline several factors that determine the success of nonviolent resistance campaigns. They further argue that nonviolent campaigns are more likely to engage a higher level of participation than violent campaigns, due to real and perceived barriers, concluding that physical, informational, and moral barriers are lower in nonviolent campaigns than in violent campaigns. (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011).

High participation incorporates several different points that are of the utmost importance for the probability of a successful campaign. First, diverse participation in terms of age, gender, ethnicity, religion, ideology, profession, and socioeconomic status makes it more difficult for a regime to isolate participants and use extensive repression. Secondly, diverse participation also amplifies the possibility of tactical diversity, since everybody brings unique capacities and skills, which in turn increases the pressure and makes it more likely to outmaneuver the regime. Thirdly, diverse participation may tighten the network between participants of the resistance and actors of the regime, such as security forces, who may then develop a link, which may lead to another of the key factors, loyalty shifts (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011).

Chenoweth and Stephan (2011) put much emphasis on loyalty shifts when determining the success of nonviolent resistance campaigns. By acquiring defectors within the elite or right below the elite, a resistance campaign can shift the power-relations vis-à-vis the regime. In their research, they generated a variable that solely identifies defection within security forces in regards to loyalty shifts. While nonviolent campaigns do burden the state budget they also lead police and military officers to consider the risks and costs for the security forces and may, hence, see the nonviolent resistance as a bargaining partner rather than a foe. Moreover, continued resistance may not burden solely the state but the economic elite, which may lead them to pressure the regime to adopt policies toward the resistance (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011). They further concluded that large nonviolent resistance campaigns are more likely to generate loyalty shifts within security forces than violent resistance. Furthermore, they emphasized the importance of participation since the chance of defection within security forces increased from around a 10 percent chance in the smallest campaign to a 60 percent chance of generating defection in the largest nonviolent campaign. Chenoweth and Stephan argue that once a campaign manages to divide the regime from its main pillars of support, such as the security forces, the state will be forced to surrender to the resistance campaign's demands (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011).

A specific type of tactic used by nonviolent resistance campaigns is **mixed resistance methods** such as methods of concentration, meaning a large number of participants collectively come together in public spaces to show resistance, e.g. Maidan Square during the Orange Revolution and Tahrir Square during the 2011 revolution. Whereas methods of dispersion entail tactics that are spread out over a wider area, such as stay-aways, consumer boycotts, and go-slow actions at work, these methods give participants more anonymity and allow them to engage in low-risk actions, hence, providing more protection. Furthermore, shifts between methods of concentration and methods of dispersion establish the most effectiveness and resilience for resistance campaigns. Chenoweth and Stephan (2011) further suggest that a campaign is more likely to generate innovative tactics if the participation is larger and more diverse. Additionally, they argue that an overreliance on a single leader may constrain the campaign, and make a more difficult transition to democracy since politics then tend to be personalized (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011).

Resilience refers to the ability of resistance actors to pursue collective action despite actions aimed to curb and prevent said actors by opponents, hence, resilience can be measured

through the ability to gain and maintain large participation and to continue the resistance despite repression, this entails maintaining assets and resources and switching up tactics against the opponent (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011). In 88 percent of all the cases in Chenoweth and Stephan's (2011) data set, resistance campaigns were met with violent repression from the regime, which may backfire if there is a widespread empathy among the civilian population for the campaign, hence, turning passive supporters into active supporters, as could be seen in the Orange Revolution. Chenoweth and Stephan (2011) show that when regimes use violent repression, a nonviolent campaign has more than a 22 percent chance of success than a violent campaign (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011).

Additional factors that may hinder or facilitate the success of nonviolent resistance movements

Large participation and a commitment to nonviolent resistance are viewed as signs of the legitimacy and essence of the campaign in the **international community**, hence, as Chenoweth and Stephan (2011) show, increasing the possibility of diplomatic support by 70 percent for nonviolent campaigns. However, their study shows that in regards to material support, foreign governments are over 40 percent more prone to support violent campaigns, in the hope of using them as proxies, rather than supporting nonviolent campaigns. Since external state support may be inconsistent, it is, unfortunately, also unreliable. Furthermore, states often attach their aid to a multitude of conditions, indeed undermining the relationship between the nonviolent resistance and the civilian population, increasing the difficulty for the nonviolent campaign, the removal of support for the regime from the international community can help nonviolent campaigns to gain some leverage, additionally, Chenoweth and Stephan conclude that sanctions have no standardized influence on a nonviolent movement's success (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011).

Chenoweth and Stephan further state that **technology** does enable people to quickly spread their grievances and information that can reach millions of people. It enables resistance campaigns to popularize their slogans and can bring in a huge amount of participants (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011).

Chenoweth and Stephan (2011) found that even failed nonviolent campaigns have better long-term effects on promoting democracy and civil peace in contrast to the long-term effects

of a successful violent campaign. While it is often said that history repeats itself, this is not entirely false, since history becomes part of the **collective memory**. Campaigns that have demonstrated great discipline in nonviolent tactics have shown to have lesser chances of violent upsurge after the transition. Whereas, violent campaigns that succeed have been shown to create weak institutions and often use violence toward their citizens (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011). By corroborating Ackerman and Karatnycky's findings, Chenoweth and Stephan have concluded that there is an over 50 percent bigger probability of a country becoming a democracy if there has been a successful nonviolent campaign in comparison to a successful violent campaign (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011).

Moreover, Chenoweth and Stephan state that they have found no patterns that would emphasize structural factors in determining whether a campaign will fail or succeed (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011). Additionally, it is important to mention that Chenoweth and Stephan did not invent the wheel but rather followed in the footsteps of Gene Sharp, who concluded similar factors.

Chenoweth's 2021 modification to the framework

A decade later in 2021, Chenoweth (2021) argues that the last two decades have given us more nonviolent campaigns than what has been seen during the whole twentieth century. According to Chenoweth, there are several reasons behind this **upsurge of nonviolent campaigns**, one being that this last decade has shown that more and more countries are moving from democracies and becoming more authoritarian, Chenoweth further suggests that this might be an indication of why people around the world feel that it might be essential to mobilize against oppression. Chenoweth's data (2021), declare that between 1900 and 2019, 50 percent of all nonviolent revolutions succeeded, but it also shows that **since 2010 the effectiveness and success rates of all revolutions have declined.** Even though nonviolent campaigns have improved in their relative rate of success compared with violent campaigns from a margin of two-to-one to a margin of three-to-one, the overall success of revolutionary campaigns has lost effectiveness in the short term (Chenoweth, 2021).

Chenoweth takes up a couple of explanations as to why the effectiveness of nonviolent resistance campaigns has declined during the last decade. First, nonviolent resistance campaigns may be **confronting more difficult regimes**, where regimes are trying to suppress nonviolent campaigns by strategies such as imprisoning members of the opposition,

delegitimizing the campaign by spreading rumors, or provoking members of the nonviolent resistance campaign into using violence. Secondly, **regimes are learning and adapting to nonviolent resistance campaigns**. Chenoweth states that authoritarian regimes might not have understood the power of the people back in the day, whereas, today a nonviolent resistance campaign is more commonly understood to be a threat to the authoritarian regime. Since nonviolent resistance campaigns have also become more universally used, regimes have had more cases to analyze to further develop political approaches to repression. Chenoweth further concludes that these explanations might have affected the decline in success but she further argues that they are not the key reasons and that it essentially comes down to the characteristics of the campaign in itself (Chenoweth, 2021).

According to Chenoweth (2021), one of the most important key factors for success is the **number of participants**, where she has concluded that 3,5 percent of the country's population has the power to overthrow a regime. Moreover, Chenoweth's data (2021) shows how the average size of nonviolent campaigns has changed during these last decades, from 2 percent of a country's population in the 1980s, to 2,7 percent in the 1990s, to eventually decreasing to less than 1,3 percent of participants during the peak of resistance since 2010 (Chenoweth, 2021). Furthermore, Chenoweth emphasizes that too much confidence in mass **demonstrations** might be one of the reasons for the decline of effectiveness (Chenoweth, 2021). Additionally, Chenoweth states that nonviolent resistance campaigns tend to have a better success rate when remaining **resilient** and disciplined in maintaining nonviolent actions, whereas, violence not only curbs diverse participation but also diminishes the ability to create defection (Chenoweth, 2021).

Chenoweth adds in her recent research that the **international community** will not withdraw its support towards the regime unless the nonviolent movement is already gaining ground. Furthermore, she adds a discussion on sanctions, by foreign policy experts arguing that sanctions are just as important symbolically as practically (Chenoweth, 2021).

In regards to **technology and social media**, Chenoweth's research from 2021 points out the flip side of digital activism by stating that it makes it harder to bring these people together to create an effective organization that can establish their shared goals and plans. Moreover, Chenoweth notes that regimes will use digital activities to their advantage by surveilling,

suppressing, spreading propaganda, and by rallying a countermobilization. Hence, the usage of digital activism and social media can be seen as a double-edged sword (Chenoweth, 2021).

What is a completely new addition within Chenoweth's 2021 research is that she declares that regimes have developed a sort of handbook of sophisticated ways to repress nonviolent resistance campaigns which she addresses as **'smart repression'**. The idé to use specific types of repression to delegitimize nonviolent resistance campaigns, hence destroying them from within, without activating the backfire effect. This involves blaming foreigners and outsiders for their domestic political problems, labeling resistance groups as terrorists or traitors, assimilating resistance groups into legislative reforms as a way to divide and conquer, paying off loyalists and punishing defectors from the inner circle, starting to countermobilize by e.g. paying loyalists to counter demonstrate, planting provocateurs to achieve an eruption of violence, dependence on outside forces to avoid any defection, censorship, surveillance, suppressing international and domestic press freedom, banning international observers from monitoring elections, inserting pseudo-legitimate laws to emphasize their power, and finally the cooperation and sharing of information between leaders and repressive governments on how to suppress nonviolent resistance campaigns (Chenoweth, 2021).

Chenoweth's framework will be applied to the three chosen cases to explore the relevance of the mentioned factors for the development of each case and to further understand what might be missing in the analysis of factors leading to success or failure. Her framework is thereafter used as the core framework from which to improve and amplify a more inclusive understanding of the phenomenon.

4. Methodological Framework

4.1. Qualitative Desk Study

Qualitative research is generally used within social science and uses the role of the theory in relation to the research through an inductive or abductive approach and takes an interpretive epistemological orientation, which emphasizes the understanding [of] rather than the explanation [of], it further takes the ontological position of constructionism, which considers social entities as socially constructed and generated by the perceptions and actions of social

actors (Bryman, 2016). As such this correlates strongly with the general topic of nonviolent resistance movements. This topic is better suited as a desk study since it offers the researcher the opportunity to do cross-country analysis and further provides variation in the collected data, moreover, the desk study allows the researcher to examine the movements from its starting point to the present time.

4.2. Abductive Reasoning

Since an abductive approach can assist in the understanding of how an individual phenomenon may be or is part of a general structure, and can also be viewed as redescription or recontextualization, this fits perfectly in regards to this thesis and will help to further understand and explain the already known phenomenon of nonviolent resistance movements (Danermark, 2002). Danermark (2002) explains the essence needed to be able to take an abductive approach in three points; first, we need an empirical phenomenon, which we, secondly, relate to a rule, that, thirdly, will lead us to a new hypothesis about the phenomenon. In this research, all the essentials needed according to Danermark (2002) for an abductive approach can be noted; first, the phenomenon studied is nonviolent resistance movements, which we, secondly, will analyze through a framework developed by Chenoweth, that, thirdly, will lead us to new arguments about nonviolent resistance movements. However, this thesis moves in between deduction and abduction, the aim is not to test a theory since it was quite clear when studying the framework that there were several questions regarding the framework and a lot to criticize. However, as Chenoweth's framework is the only seriously considered framework in research on this topic it constitutes the theoretical lens and starting point, as this thesis rather takes an abductive approach and uses the lens quite strongly for this study.

4.3. Structured Focused Comparison

The choice to conduct the study through the method of structured focused comparison as presented by Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett (2005) has been decided since it will give a deeper understanding of the phenomenon of nonviolent resistance movements while understanding the differences and similarities between the cases. The thesis is structured in that the questions reflect the research objective and are asked of each chosen case to be able to make a systematic comparison, furthermore, the thesis is focused in that it only examines certain aspects of the studied cases. This allows analyzing the data not solely within the case

but also across cases which grants the opportunity to enhance theoretical development (George & Bennett, 2005).

Country background to the chosen cases: Sudan, Myanmar, and Lebanon

All three countries have ongoing nonviolent resistance movements that have the goal to achieve maximalist goals such as regime change, which was a condition for Chenoweth and Stephan in their quest to prove the effectiveness of nonviolent campaigns. To further build on their framework this thesis, therefore, studies cases with the same conditions, first that the campaigns start as nonviolent movements and secondly that they demand maximalist goals. Additionally, the reason for using ongoing movements is in part because these cases have not been covered by Chenoweth herself, and the aim is to learn from them so that we can help while they are still continuing.

The three chosen cases are located in three different areas, Sudan in Africa, Myanmar in Asia, and Lebanon in the Middle East, but have all had a history of colonialism and gained their independence respectively in 1956, 1948, and 1943. Even though they all have experienced instances of democracy, those periods have been short-lived and the three countries have all been riddled with economic and climate hardship, violent conflicts, and civil wars. Whereas Sudan holds a population of 45,9 million people and is made up of both African and Arab ethnicities, the majority of around 97% of the population are Sunni Muslims and a minority are Christian followers (About Sudan, 2022). On the other hand, the Myanmarese population exceeds 57 million people and is made up of a variety of ethnicities, Burman being the majority, followed by Shan, Karen, Rakhine, Chinese, Mon, Indian, and other smaller minority groups. Furthermore, this comes with a vast spectrum of religions, but a large majority of around 89% of the population is Buddhist, followed by minority groups of both Baptist and Roman Catholic Christians, and Muslims (About us., 2022). Lebanon, on the other hand, holds a population that reaches slightly more than 6 million people, including almost a sixth being refugees from Palestine and Syria. The population is mostly made up of Arab ethnicity, with some minority groups, although, the Lebanese population is practicing a vast spectrum of religions, containing Muslims both Shia and Sunni, Christian groups such as Maronite, Greek Orthodox, Catholic, and Protestant, and a small minority of Druze (Lebanon country., 2021). Despite these differences, all three countries have similar experiences with conflicts that have marked them deeply. In Sudan, the Darfur conflict that broke out in 2003

increased the number of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), and the secession in 2011 of the oil-rich South, now known as South Sudan, led to the Sudanese Gross Domestic Product (GDP) decreasing by more than 50% between 2011 and 2019 (About Sudan, 2022). In Myanmar, the 2017 genocide of Rohingya Muslims in the Rakhine state, forced hundreds of thousands of people to flee, creating a wave of IDPs (Plan International.., 2022). Whereas in Lebanon, the National Pact dictated after their independence, created power struggles that would lead to the sectarianism that is still visible to this day. Furthermore, international actors maintained a firm grip in Lebanon after the end of the civil war in 1990, where the international community endorsed Syria to act as Lebanon's guardian, which unfortunately gave Syria the power and opportunity to cast its legal foundation in Lebanon (Kurtulus, 2009; Fakhoury, 2020). Internationally speaking, Sudan holds member status within the United Nations (UN), the League of Arab States (LAS), and the African Union (AU), whereas Myanmar is a member state within the UN, and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), while Lebanon is a founding member of the UN and part of LAS (About Sudan, 2022; About us.., 2022; Fakhoury, 2020)

4.4. Text Analysis

The approach used to analyze documents and texts, whether they be in pictures or words, is referred to as text analysis and aims at evaluating content through predetermined categories in a way that is replicable and systematic (Bryman, 2016). The advantage of using text analysis is that it is referred to as an unobtrusive method, hence a non-reactive method, meaning that there are no research participants which therefore minimizes the ethical considerations. One of the limitations of text analysis is that it can only be as good as the texts and documents that are at hand (Bryman, 2016). This thesis will use text analysis as a tool to determine how far the movements in the chosen cases have been able to fulfill the factors outlined in Chenoweth's framework.

4.5. Sources and their Reliability and Validity

While reliability and validity are important to judge the quality of quantitative research, there are ongoing debates among qualitative researchers about whether reliability, validity, and generalizability are relevant to evaluating qualitative research (Bryman, 2016). Reliability within qualitative research implies that the approach taken is consistent, in this research, articles and other findings will be checked to ensure that they do not contain any obvious

mistakes. Validity is based on determining whether the findings are accurate from different points of view. In qualitative research this is done through terms such as trustworthiness, authenticity, and credibility (Creswell & Creswell, 2018). This research will incorporate validity strategies, which will be done through multiple approaches e.g. presenting discrepancies, and implementing data from different sources. Furthermore, peer-reviewed articles have already been checked for validity and reliability, while further material such as books and other articles, pictures, and documents will help broaden the findings, hence creating a conglomeration of findings that ensures validity to the research (Creswell & Creswell, 2018).

This research will analyze texts from news articles, organizations, and published articles, retrieved from outlets such as Aljazeera, Reporters Without Borders, The Guardian, BBC News, The African Report, The Economic Times, Reuters, and France24. Furthermore, information and data have also been taken from organizations such as UN News, Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, and The Relief Web, and additionally, been combined and supplemented with academic papers and research, to assess the strengths and weaknesses of Chenoweth's model and how can we move towards a more inclusive model with the help of the three case studies.

4.6. Limitations and Delimitations

Considering limitations within this thesis, it is important to mainly take into account the fact that there were limitations in language, hence, most of the news and academic articles being used within this thesis derive from Western outlets. Furthermore, recently the media has been extremely focused on reporting the Ukraine - Russia war, which for months has pushed other world news to the side. Additionally, there appears to be a downplay in the media in regards to reporting uprisings specifically when they do not occur within the Western part of the world. Moreover, retrieving information about ongoing cases may yield negative consequences for the guarantee of the acquired data, which in some instances has made it hard to cross-check the results. Lastly, regimes have been deliberately trying to conceal information and prevent access by journalists, which has put limitations or at least difficulties to acquire certain information or cross-check the information.

Several delimitations have been applied to this research. Within the framework of the bachelor's thesis, the decision was taken to delimit the structure to three cases rather than more case studies. Furthermore, the choice of case studies was limited by the condition that they are ongoing nonviolent resistance movements that have the aim to achieve maximalist goals as described by Chenoweth, which naturally limited the choice and number of cases.

5. The history of nonviolent resistance in Sudan, Myanmar, and Lebanon

5.1. Sudan

For the Sudanese people, one could say that social uprisings are part of their identity, whether to gain independence or overthrow a government, social uprisings are not unfamiliar. In 1964, tens of thousands of nonviolent civilians took to the streets in anti-government demonstrations that declared general strikes until their demands would be met. Within two weeks President Ibrahim Abboud resigned, the military rule was liquidated, and a transitional government was leading the country (Hasan, 1967).

By the end of March 1985, students were demonstrating against the rising food prices, the involvement of the US, and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). This led to a nonviolent movement that wanted to see the end of Sharia laws implemented by President Jafaar Numeiri in 1983, the end of foreign policies, and the resignation of the government. Within a week, the capital Khartoum was filled with between one and two million people demonstrating, the military defected and subsequently arranged a coup, on 6 April 1985 which brought down President Numeiri, and they further established a Transitional Military Council (TMC). Unfortunately, while Sudan has a history of revolutions, Sudan also has a history of coups. Just as Abboud and Numeiri had taken power through coups, so did Omar al-Bashir in 1989, he would hold on to the power for 30 years (Salih, 1990).

Once Omar al-Bashir had taken power, he established a military junta revolving around the alliance of a political party that in 1996 founded the National Congress Party (NCP), which would remain in power until al-Bashir's fall. During al-Bashir's rule, he privatized public enterprises, implemented disturbing policies, and extended the Islamization of Sudan, and emphasized ethnic hierarchies. Discrimination of non-Arabic communities increased

religious, racial, and regional separation and violence in Sudan, making it almost impossible for them to find unity. This gave al-Bashir the illusion that his control of power would inevitably reach a point of no return (Awad, 2022).

For years the Sudanese had seen and experienced violence, racism, corruption, and socio-economic problems in their country. When pressure from the IMF resulted in the ending of subsidies for fuel and wheat, people had had enough. The first demonstrations took place in mid-December 2018, in towns outside of Khartoum. Soon enough people from all walks of life gathered in Khartoum and nonviolently demanded democracy and the termination of al-Bashirs' brutal dictatorship, and with that introduced the Sudanese Revolution (Bassil & Zhang, 2021). Already in 2016, a group of journalists, lawyers, and doctors had come together due to the deteriorating economy and formed an unauthorized umbrella labor union, the Sudanese Professional Association (SPA). The SPA would be the foundation of the Sudanese Revolution by introducing the Declaration of Freedom and Change, which demanded democracy, sustainable economic development, and the resignation of al-Bashir. A variety of different organizations such as women's rights groups, civil rights organizations, political parties, and more united around the Declaration of Freedom and Change, and further formed the Forces of Freedom and Change (FFC) (Grewal, 2021). As people in Sudan united and sustained protests, it eventually led to the withdrawal of the NCP, leaving al-Bashir to declare a state of emergency on 22 February 2019. The protesters maintained their discipline and resilience throughout March and so, in early April the military finally understood the signs of the times coming, hence shifting their loyalties from the government to join the nonviolent protesters, which resulted in the overthrow of al-Bashir on 11 April 2019.

The former vice president formed a TMC, but civilians were not agreeing with this move and took to the streets again demanding for him to step down. Within 24 hours he was replaced by General Abdel Fattah Al-Burhan and Mohamed Hamdan 'Hemeti' Dagalo, the leader of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), who was the leading force behind the atrocities in Darfur, which the International Criminal Court has declared as ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. Unsatisfied with the leadership of Al-Burhan and Hemeti, the nonviolent movement persisted (Awad, 2022; Bassil & Zhang, 2021). In front of the military headquarters in Khartoum, a 61-day long sit-in had been ongoing when on 3 June 2019, a large part of the TMC and RSF brutally murdered over 100 people to disperse the sit-in. The

act is now referred to as the Khartoum Massacre. However, military forces were divided, and some eventually barged in to protect the nonviolent protesters (Awad, 2022; "Chaos and.., 2020). Due to the ruthless act, the AU sanctioned and suspended Sudan. The people never gave up, not even in the face of repression, and a couple of weeks after the Khartoum Massacre they took to the streets again. Through mediation and with a push from the UN, the FFC and the TMC agreed in August 2019 to a power-sharing transitional government for 39 months, which would ultimately lead to elections by the end of 2022. In September 2019, General Al-Burhan, and Prime Minister (PM) Abdalla Hamdok were inaugurated, which led to the withdrawal of sanctions and the readmission to the AU. The power-sharing transitional government made little progress, by repealing certain features of Sharia law. However, power-sharing is far from a perfect model (Awad, 2022; Bassil & Zhang, 2021).

On 25 October 2021, nearly four weeks before General Al-Burhan was to hand over the power to a civil representative, he coordinated a coup in collaboration with his deputy, Hemeti, the Minister of Finance, and the Governor-General of Darfur. General Al-Burhan seized power, declared a state of emergency, dissolved the power-sharing transitional government, and arrested pro-democracy party leaders, and members of the cabinet, including PM Hamdok. Meanwhile, state television was overrun by the military, the internet was cut off, and roads, bridges, and the airport in Khartoum were all blocked (The Sudan..., 2022).

The day after the coup Al-Burhan stated in a speech that this action was made to maintain the path toward democracy and to prevent a civil war (Khair, 2022). PM Hamdok was placed under house arrest, until a deal between the military and Hamdok was made in November 2021, which established that the constitutional declaration from 2019 would be applied. While the deal was greeted by the international community, it was rejected by civilians. As a consequence twelve cabinet ministers resigned, and tens of thousands of people flooded the streets, once again, to demand a civil government, the release of political prisoners, and that the military be excluded from the future government. As a result, Hamdok resigned in January 2022, and the power is still held by the military (Sudan PM.., 2022).

5.2. Myanmar

The Myanmarese people are not unfamiliar with nonviolent resistance uprisings, nor to be

met and surrounded with brutal violence. In 1962, the democratically elected representatives were ousted from power when General Win led a coup with the military known as Tatmadaw. In mid-1974, a nonviolent sit-in was launched by oil workers protesting against the Tatmadaw, who answered by firing live ammunition, killing up to 100 people. The strategy of General Win to maintain power was to quickly exterminate all sorts of disapproval (Maizland, 2022; Pollard, 2015).

The Bloody Friday Massacre occurred at the beginning of 1988 when at least 100 students were gunned down by the Tatmadaw, triggering a revolution that was established in mid-August when millions of people marched through the capital, while hundreds of thousands marched throughout the rest of the country, demanding democracy (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011). General Win resigned and gave over the power to another General, keeping the violent Tatmadaw in power (Maizland, 2022; Pollard, 2015). During the 1988 resistance movement, Aung San Suu Kyi rose to become the face of the democracy movement. After the failure to oust the Tatmadaw, Suu Kyi along with others formed an opposition party, the National League for Democracy (NLD), but in 1989 the Tatmadaw detained several opposition figures, including Suu Kyi. She remained in prison and under house arrest for 21 years, until her release in 2010 (Maizland, 2022).

20 years later the Tatmadaw was truly challenged again. In 2007, dire living conditions triggered sweeping nonviolent protests. The Saffron Revolutions' leading forces were the Buddhist monks dressed in their saffron-colored robes. By calling for nonviolent demonstrations to demand democracy and the resignation of the Tatmadaw, they quickly gathered legitimacy, and soon enough, the movement was characterized by mass demonstrations (Pollard, 2015). In comparison to 1988, the Tatmadaw did not immediately engage in brutal violence, they rather launched a propaganda campaign, but as mass participation grew the Tatmadaw increased the violent crackdown. Soon enough, the violence had grown so awful that people went into hiding or fled the country (Selth, 2008). When facing international pressure, the Tatmadaw seemingly pulled back a little, while establishing the 2008 constitution, giving themselves comprehensive power in the case of civilian rule. This included total control over domestic security and guaranteed seats for the military in the parliament; the constitution remains to this day. By 2011, the Tatmadaw officially dispersed and established a transitional civilian-military government, which in reality was predominantly military. Myanmar held its first multiparty elections in 2015, and

the NLD won triumphantly, making Suu Kyi the de facto leader of Myanmar, although the Tatmadaw still held on to a great extent of power (Maizland, 2022).

During the 2020 elections, the NLD was facing a Tatmadaw-backed party, meanwhile, the International Court of Justice had a case pending against Tatmadaw leaders for the allegation of genocide against Rohingya Muslims. Suu Kyi defended the Tatmadaw and rejected the allegations, and acquired the NLD a win in the elections (Mahaseth & Tulsyan, 2022). General Min Aung Hlaing commander-in-chief for the Tatmadaw claimed that the elections had been fraudulent, and so on 1 February 2021, the Tatmadaw, detained President Win Myint and State Counselor Suu Kyi, as well as members of the NLD. General Hlaing also ousted 24 ministers, and replaced them with 11 people of his choosing, he further declared a state of emergency (Mahaseth & Tulsyan, 2022).

5.3. Lebanon

In mid-2004, Syria had pressured the Lebanese parliament to prolong the term for three more years in favor of the sitting pro-Syria President Emile Lahoud. This did not go unnoticed, nor was it welcomed in Lebanon or by the international community (Kurtulus, 2009). Meanwhile, the relationship between Syria and the Lebanese PM Rafig Hariri was crumbling, which brought repercussions that would be known in Beirut, on 14 February 2005, when a car bomb went off, assassinating 23 people including PM Hariri, initiating the Cedar Revolution. Thousands of Lebanese people took to the streets, accusing the Syrian government of assassination and demanding that the Syrian military leave Lebanon (Sutton, 2014). For weeks people demonstrated nonviolently while demanding the termination of the pro-Syrian President Lahoud and his government led by Omar Kamari. By the end of April 2005, Bashar al-Assad the president of Syria, withdrew all Syrian military from Lebanon, and Kamari resigned, just in time for elections, and so a government was formed through a power-sharing agreement between two parties. Even though the demonstrations were nonviolent and the anti-Syrian demonstrators achieved their goal to oust Syrian troops, the backdrop was an increase in sectarianism and an emphasis on security issues, which gave negative ripple effects on the economy (Kurtulus, 2009; Sutton, 2014).

Between 2006 and 2010, Lebanon was riddled with both internal and external violent conflicts (Doyle, 2016; Rizkallah, 2017). The 2011 Arab Spring in Lebanon, unlike

elsewhere, was not necessarily out to overthrow a dictatorship but rather wanted to demolish the whole political system that has been in power since the end of the civil war. The movement fluctuated and resurfaced in 2013 when the parliament disregarded the Constitution by extending its term. However, the movement was inadequate to impact mass participation or have an impact on politics (Halabi, 2019). In 2015, the movement resurfaced again, due to a waste crisis. However, unable to unify under a shared goal the movement fizzled out (Halabi, 2019).

The elections in May 2018, ended up with a power-sharing government, this time between the Free Patriotic Movement with Michel Aoun as President and Hezbollah (Halabi, 2019). During 2018 and 2019 issues were abundant, from political disagreements, and an economic state of emergency, to over 100 wildfires that spread throughout Lebanon. Simultaneously, violent clashes were carried out between supporters of different sectarian political parties. The coup de grâce came when the government announced that new taxes, including a WhatsApp tax, were to be imposed due to the economic crisis (Lebanon's October.., 2021).

The October Movement was properly introduced on 17 October 2019, when tens of thousands of Lebanese people took to the streets throughout the country to demand economic and social reforms, an end to corruption, and ultimately the resignation of all political representatives. From early on, peaceful demonstrators have been met by teargas, rubber bullets, beatings, and at times live ammunition by the government. Although the mass protests managed to get the government of Saad Hariri to resign, that did not stop the protester, since they felt that nothing had truly changed. In January 2020, a new government was appointed, led by Hassan Diab, still, protesters maintained, demanding the fall of the political system, hence, the resignation of the government and an end to sectarianism. On 4 August 2020, over 300,000 people became homeless, over 6,500 people were injured, and more than 200 were killed when nearly 3,000 tons of ammonium nitrate exploded in the port of Beirut. This tragic event fueled the October Movement, with demands for accountability, and the end of the whole political system, which in turn, led to the resignation of the government led by Hassan Diab (The unprecedented.., 2020; Global Protest.., 2022). Saad Hariri was given the task to form a new government, but incapable of doing so, he resigned yet again in July 2021 (Chehayeb, 2021). After 13 months of stalemate, a new government led by Najib Mikati, a billionaire businessman was formed and picked by the same political elite that the Lebanese people have been trying to overthrow (Lebanese leaders., 2021).

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From 2019 until today the Lebanese pound has lost 95 percent of its value, leaving more than 75 percent of the Lebanese population in poverty (Chehayeb, 2022).

6. Comparing factors that determine success and failure

6.1. Participation

On 27 October 2021, two days after the coup in Sudan, news channels urged people to take to the streets of the capital Khartoum and its neighboring city Omdurman (African Union.., 2021). Five days after the coup, tens of thousands of nonviolent demonstrators, coming from all parts of life; professionals, unemployed, students, women, people of all ages and ethnicities, had filled the streets (Protesters.., 2021; Sudan coup.., 2021). According to Global Protest Tracker and the Reliefweb, the peak size of a demonstration had more than 100,000 people taking part in the anti-government protest in Sudan (Global Protest.., 2022; Atrocity.., 2022). Furthermore, there are no signs that show any kind of withdrawal in participation, regardless of violent repression, timeframe, or other circumstances, which indicates positive signs for the movement and the people of Sudan.

Within a week of the military coup in Myanmar on 1 February 2021, tens of thousands of people took to the streets in nonviolent protests across the country (Evidence police.., 2021). A year later in February 2022, Human Rights Watch estimated millions of people protested nonviolently against the coup, but according to the Global Protest Tracker, the peak size of a demonstration had more than 100,000 people taking part. However, this indicates that mass participation has been growing during the year, since the military coup (Myanmar: Coup.., 2022; Global Protest.., 2022). Furthermore, it appears as if there is no decrease in the number of participants but rather an increase.

In Lebanon, hundreds of thousands of people protested in October 2019 demanding the resignation of the government and the end of sectarianism. On 4 August 2020, the Beirut port blast further stirred up the demonstrations throughout the country (Bosqui & Hanna, 2022; Heller, 2021). According to Global Protest Tracker, the peak size of a demonstration saw over 1,000,000 people taking part in demanding the end of the political system (Global Protest.., 2022). Even though that is the highest number measured out of the three cases, the

Lebanese uprising has, unfortunately, had issues maintaining the mass participation in the streets, this does not however mean that the Lebanese people do not support the movement anymore. The economical crisis has had enormous consequences that have impacted not only people's ability to commute and partake in demonstrations but also pushed people's main concerns to be directed towards securing their minimum needs.

According to Chenoweth's recent research (2021), participation is one of the most important factors for a nonviolent resistance movement. When analyzing the three nonviolent resistance movements in Sudan, Myanmar, and Lebanon it is clear that both Sudan and Myanmar have had a steady increase in mass participation over time. While it appears to be truly widespread in Sudan, in Myanmar there seems to be an apparent division into two sides, for or against the regime. Whereas Lebanon has had a motion of ebb and flow in regards to participation, that started strong then decreased, then built momentum again after the Beirut port blast to yet decrease after some time, which might be a consequence due to the economic crisis.

6.2. Defection of powerful actors

Sudanese, government employees, medical personnel, and state oil company workers have joined the flourishing campaign of civil disobedience (Protesters.., 2021; African Union.., 2021). However, there is no data on whether there has been any military defection like there was during the demonstrations against al-Bashir.

In Myanmar, on the other hand, soldiers of all ranks have defected from the very start of the military coup due to its brutal violent repression on nonviolent resisters. The organization, People's Soldiers, helps soldiers defect from the Tatmadaw, and states that approximately 2,500 soldiers have defected within just a year since the coup (Quinley, 2022). This is an astonishing number since the Tatmadaw is created to work as a highly controlled society, the army base is the glue holding everybody in place, soldiers' families and relatives live on the base, children go to school on the base, and soldiers receive an abundance of advantages such as free housing and free school (Quinley, 2022). Considering this, defecting without taking all your relatives with you, surely means that they are gonna endure the consequences, but trying to defect with the whole family surely makes it logistically harder and comes with other consequences.

In Lebanon the people have seen several resignations, however, these have not led to any changes. Furthermore, what concerns the economic sector, the Central Bank in Lebanon is closely allied with the political elite, so when the banking sector disputed a recovery plan that was presented in April 2020, the parliament made sure to present a new recovery plan that would include the interests of the banking sector, hence, securing the loyalty of at least one of the main actors in Lebanese politics (International Alert, 2020). Even though the economical crisis has created dissatisfaction and compelled soldiers to take on extra jobs or even quit, this does not necessarily mean that they have defected and switched sides to support the Lebanese uprising (US plans.., 2022).

In Chenoweth and Stephans' research from 2011, an amount of emphasis was put on loyalty shifts, specifically regarding military forces. When comparing Sudan, Myanmar, and Lebanon, it appears as the pillars of support in Sudan have either not been properly sought out, aimed at, or convinced, since there have been no signs of defection whatsoever. However, this does not suggest that there haven't been any loyalty shifts. Whereas in Myanmar it is obvious that soldiers have defected and openly joined the resistance movement. In Lebanon, on the other hand, one main pillar of support appears to be the economic elite and unfortunately, they have not been shifting at all. However, some soldiers have quit, but this does not necessarily mean that they have joined the resistance movement. Furthermore, since Myanmar has used constructive resistance through a parallel government and military, it might be easier in a sense for soldiers in Myanmar to defect and shift their loyalties, since they would be able to have a specific place to turn to, whereas in Sudan and Lebanon the defected soldier might feel more vulnerable.

6.3. Mixed resistance methods

The Sudanese people have been quick in mobilizing demonstrations, launching civil disobedience campaigns, they have further arranged sit-ins, closed down shops, and barricades have been put in place to stop export to Egypt and to cut off resources to the military government in Khartoum. Furthermore, the Sudanese resistors have used language, poetry, and music as methods to gain participation and emphasize nonviolence. Moreover, political detainees in Soba prison started a hunger strike, to keep up the resistance and resilience even throughout incarceration (Protesters.., 2021; Amin, 2022; Tarek, 2022). Even

though there are a series of demonstrations and sit-ins being conducted throughout Sudan, it is clear that the resistance has not been solely relying on visible methods, considering that language, poetry and music have had and still have a huge impact on the discipline to stay nonviolent, and has further created unity and maintained resilience.

In Myanmar, on the other hand, people banged pots and pans, as well as, honked their car horns in protest, the day after the coup. Two days after the coup, mass civil disobedience took place as government workers walked off their jobs, among these were teachers, doctors, and bankers (Myanmar coup:..., 2022). Moreover, the Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM) was formed to, among other things, organize mass demonstrations, strikes, and raise funding to aid people to receive food and medicine (Myanmar: What.., 2022). Additionally, the people in Myanmar deployed the method of constructive resistance by assembling ethnic minority representatives, civil society activists, and members of the parliament who together have formed a parallel government, the National Unity Government (NUG), to oppose the military junta (National Unity Government, 2022). Furthermore, there seems to be a continuance of using different methods and not solely relying on demonstrations, this is most visibly shown by the usage of constructive resistance in the form of a parallel government, unfortunately, this has also brought a tolerated violent flank to the movement.

Whereas, in Lebanon civilians have used a range of different methods from the beginning of the uprising, such as burning tires to create roadblocks, staging demonstrations, sit-ins, protests, and covering the highways with petrol to ensure that cars could not drive through. Furthermore, universities have shut down across the country for several weeks, time and time again, as students and professors took to the streets (Bosqui & Hanna, 2022; Chehayeb, 2021; Chehayeb, 2022). Another recurring method used by the Lebanese protesters has been the use of humorous resistance, to counter allegations aimed at diminishing the uprising (Malmvig & Fakhoury, 2021). Considering that Lebanon has an ongoing economic crisis that has decreased the participation in demonstrations, this has affected the choice of methods.

When comparing the different methods used by the three separate resistance movements in Sudan, Myanmar, and Lebanon, one can see the similarities in disobedience, concentration, and dispersion, however, there are some major differences. Sudan has taken advantage of methods such as the usage of language, poetry, and music, whereas Myanmar has emphasized their resistance through the usage of constructive resistance by implementing a

parallel government. Lebanon on the other hand have used the tactic of humor as a way to ridicule and delegitimize the regime, but they appear to rely more and more on nonvisible methods or might, unfortunately, be dying out. Furthermore, it is always hard to distinguish whether a movement has an overreliance on demonstrations, since there are an array of methods of resistance that may not be as visible as demonstrations, or may actually be deliberately hidden, but that still causes real effects.

6.4. Resilience

Resilience has continuously been proven to be a strong trait of the Sudanese nonviolent resisters as they have maintained discipline and resilience. Since the coup, on 25 October 2021 to this day, people have returned to the streets over and over again, calling for civilian rule, regardless of the violent repression of the military. In Myanmar, the civilian people have relentlessly staged demonstrations, protests, and sit-ins around the country since the beginning of their movement, whereas in Lebanon there has been a constant back and forth in maintaining the resilience. Both Myanmar and Lebanon were initially nonviolent resistance movements and the resilience can therefore be questioned on several levels.

6.5. Military repression / Violent flanks

Violent repression has been a reoccurring factor since the military coup in Sudan. Nonviolent demonstrators have been brutally repressed by the military through the usage of tear gas, stun grenades, and water cannons, and they have been prevented from accessing ambulances and health facilities. Furthermore, the military has fired tear gas into hospitals, and shot live ammunition at nonviolent protesters, injuring thousands and killing more than 80 people, while targeting doctors who are trying to help wounded civilians. Moreover, the UN has confirmed reports of the use of rape and gang rape by the Sudanese military on girls, women, and men attending sit-ins (Freedom House, 2022; Atrocity.., 2022;African Union..,2021).

A wide range of methods referred to as "smart repression" by Chenoweth, has been used by the military toward the nonviolent resisters in Sudan. These have included shutting down internet services as well as telecommunications across the country, which has had horrible consequences, such as, people being unable to reach out to ambulances. Because the military has used this method more than once, one would assume that the Sudanese resistors do not have an over-reliance on technology, since it might have negative repercussions.

Additionally, government officials and politicians have been detained, as well as hundreds of nonviolent protesters and key figures leading the nonviolent resistance. Where some have been released, some are still detained, and others have disappeared. The military has additionally outlawed labor unions and targeted journalists through raids, attacks, and attempted abductions, on top of arrests (Bachelet condemns.., 2021; Sudan coup.., 2021; Tarek, 2022; Freedom House, 2022). Despite all of this, the Sudanese people have not shown any tolerance for violent flanks and appear to remain a resilient nonviolent movement.

Unfortunately, in Myanmar, violence is becoming more and more tolerated within the resistance movement, which was further confirmed on 5 May 2021, when the People's Defense Force (PDF) was officially formed under the NUG (People's Defence.., 2021). The consequences were inevitable, and in December 2021, a report was made stating that the Tatmadaw had been attacked by the PDF (Rights abuses.., 2021). On 1 February 2022, exactly a year after the military coup, the PDF attacked the Tatmadaw again and killed several officials (Myanmar: What.., 2022). This will surely escalate the brutality since the vicious cycle of violence is that it only brings more violence, something well known by civilians in Myanmar.

Furthermore, one needs to keep in mind the fact that Suu Kyi defended the Tatmadaws' treatment of the Rohingya population, which further raises the question of whether the claim of wanting democracy is completely true? As we know, Myanmar is ethnically diverse, and minorities have long suffered exclusion and both structural and direct violence. Now, if the resistance movement aims to have democracy then that should pertain to everybody, including the Rohingyas.

Since the very first day of the military coup, the Myanmarese have been subjected to violence, even when demonstrating nonviolently they have been met with tear gas, water cannons, rubber bullets, and live ammunition (Evidence police.., 2021). Reports have concluded that the brutal violence has escalated, the Tatmadaw has rammed vehicles into peaceful protesters, fired rocket launchers into civilians, and food supplies have been cut off. Furthermore, the Tatmadaw has eliminated complete villages by destroying houses and burning children, women, and men to death (Rights abuses.., 2021; Goldman, 2022). According to a non-profit organization called the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners (AAPP), a year after the military coup, more than 1,500 people have been killed by

the Tatmadaw (Myanmar coup:.., 2022). The atrocities perpetrated have pushed nonviolent resisters to tolerate violent flanks within the movement, which surely has negative consequences, but on the other hand, the brutal violence might also have a backfire effect, convincing more soldiers to defect.

To maintain power without drawing too much attention governments use what Chenoweth referred to as "smart repression", and the Tatmadaw is no exception. Within a couple of weeks after the coup, the Tatmadaw declared total control of the national news outlets and general information, by eradicating independent newspapers, and blocking social media such as Twitter and Instagram, which was later followed by a complete internet shutdown (Reporters without borders, 2021). Considering this fact, it seems questionable that the Myanmar resistance movement would put too much reliance on technology. On the other hand, the NUG and the PDF do have official websites, which might be more of a way to gain legitimacy, specifically from the international community, rather than a means to reach out to their citizens.

According to the UN Human Rights office (OHCHR) and the AAPP, by December 2021 the Tatmadaw had detained more than 10,000 political prisoners, where a minimum of 175 have died in custody (Rights abuses., 2021; Goldman, 2022). In January 2022, reports were made by the Tatmadaw, stating that there had been counter-protests with an estimated 1000 people supporting them (Myanmar junta.., 2022). A strategy that has been used around the world, where authoritarians' have paid people to countermobilize pro-government demonstrations, which becomes much easier if the country is enduring economic hardship leading people to be in greater need, making people more acceptable to payoffs. Furthermore, in a speech a year after the coup, the Tatmadaw leader General Hlaing, declared all anti-coup protesters to be "terrorists" (Myanmar junta..., 2022). The strategy to try to delegitimize opposition groups by labeling them in derogatory terms such as "terrorists" or "traitors", is a method that has been used for centuries. It focuses on linguistics and a narrative approach by weaponizing words and forming a negative collective identity through the usage of linguistics by linking the identity of the movement to a specific image or reputation. This generates a perceived identity, culture, and (de)legitimacy. The aim is to destabilize the movement within the country, but also create legitimacy, internationally speaking, for the violent repression used against the movement.

The Lebanese people did not have to wait long to be met with violent repression. Nine days after the start of the movement, a sit-in was staged in Tripoli, where the military responded by shooting live ammunition and seriously harming nonviolent protesters. The violent repression from the Lebanese military has moved in waves across the country's different regions. Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch have declared that there has been excessive use of force by the military, where nonviolent protesters have been targeted with teargas, brutal beatings, water cannons, rubber and metal pellets, and live ammunition (The unprecedented.., 2020; World Report 2022.., 2022).

Furthermore, the use of "smart repression" has been ongoing from early on toward nonviolent protesters, but also toward journalists and health personnel. Both activists and journalists have been arbitrarily detained with claims of terrorism, and summoned to military courts, intending to strangle freedom of speech and quelch the freedom of peaceful gatherings. Meanwhile in detention people have been forced to sign illegal contracts stating that a person will not criticize the government or call for protests on social media. Furthermore, people have endured severe mental and physical violence, such as mock executions and brutal beatings. After the Beirut port blast in August 2020, the movement gained a little momentum, which was quickly met by accelerated violence brought by the military. Amnesty International has reported that civilian dressed men have stood next to the military during protests while shooting pellets at the nonviolent activists, many of whom have suffered from serious injuries, such as being shot with pellets in their eyes (The unprecedented.., 2020). Moreover, due to the economic crisis, the State Department in Lebanon determined to change the direction of foreign military funding to include livelihood support for the Lebanese military, to guarantee their continuance of loyalty to the government (US plans., 2022).

Unfortunately, armed violent flanks have been reported in support of different sectarian groups. In October 2021, Beirut saw its streets full of violence between supporters of different sectarian groups, which left over 30 people injured and seven dead. Furthermore, with the deteriorating economy more violent flanks have taken place in what was originally a nonviolent resistance movement (Lebanon: Country.., 2022; Lebanon protesters.., 2022).

Violence and resilience has been very differently applied in the three different cases. What is very certain is that all three regimes, whether in Sudan, Myanmar, or Lebanon, have used

violent repression against the nonviolent resistance movements, and further used what Chenoweth refers to as 'smart repression' to squash the movements. In Sudan there seems to be a strong determination to maintain resilience despite brutal violence being inflicted upon them. Furthermore, they have had no violent flanks taking charge, which leads to the conclusion that violence within the resistance movement is not acceptable. Myanmar has maintained the resistance and has not stepped back even though they have endured atrocities, on the other hand, the Myanmarese movement seems to have not only accepted violent flanks but established their military force. In comparison, Lebanon has also withstood brutal violent repression, unfortunately, this has led to violent flanks of sectarianism, consequently, the resilience has decreased. Now as stated earlier this might be due to the violence, or the economic crisis, it could also be due to sectarianism in itself. Even though the Lebanese movement brought people together over religious lines, the violence appears to split people up again and lead them back to the path of violence rather than keeping the resilience on the path of nonviolence. Furthermore, what can be said about military repression is that none of these methods are new, and so it is questionable that the repression in itself is to blame for the decrease of effectiveness in nonviolent movements.

6.6. International community

Two days after the Sudanese military coup, the AU took a clear stance against the coup by suspending Sudan from all its activities until the overthrown civilian-led transitional government would be back to lead the country towards elections. Meanwhile, the US and the World Bank condemned the military coup and suspended aid to Sudan (African Union.., 2021). Furthermore, the UN attempted to mediate a deal that aimed at returning to a power-sharing agreement in Sudan (Sudan coup.., 2021). Special Representatives for Sudan and the Head of the UN Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in Sudan, declared a month after the coup, that donors had paused development assistance to Sudan (Sudan: Mistrust.., 2021). With the UN mediating for a return to power-sharing, the nonviolent resistance movement in Sudan has increasingly lost trust in the international community, perceiving that the international community is not doing enough to support the nonviolent resistance movement, instead rather helping the Sudanese military to maintain power by pushing for a power-sharing "solution" (Tarek, 2022). This begs to ponder the question, how come the UN is so keen on this kind of arrangement? Even though power-sharing can lead to nondemocracy or democracy, to more violence, or peace. However, peace is a concept that

has been deeply explained by many, foremost by Johan Galtung that concludes that there is positive or negative peace. In regards to the attempt by the UN to push for the use of power-sharing, it seems that the goal is not to reach full positive peace, but rather to reach an end to direct violence. So, in the case of Sudan, where the military has already broken a power-sharing agreement by conducting a coup, the power-sharing agreement does not seem to have confronted structural or cultural violence. With this said, it seems obvious that a power-sharing agreement will not solve the issues in Sudan. Which leads to assumption that the international community is gaining something by pushing for this "solution".

The Myanmar military coup was quickly condemned by parts of the international community such as Antonio Guterres the UN Secretary-General, Boris Johnson the PM of the United Kingdom (UK), and the US ambassador for Myanmar, who declared it undemocratic, horrifying, and called for an end to the violence. A month after the coup, the European Union (EU) imposed travel bans and froze the assets of eleven people that were part of the coup, including the Tatmadaw General Hlaing. Meanwhile, the US followed by announcing sanctions on Myanmar (Goldman, 2022; Myanmar coup:..., 2022). Four months after the coup, the Russian Secretary of Council and General Hlaing held a meeting to emphasize a commitment to strengthen security ties among other subjects. Another four months later, General Hlaing was excluded from the summit by the ASEAN countries for the inadequacy to end the crisis (Myanmar's year.., 2022).

A year after the coup, the UK, US, Canada, and the EU had all imposed sanctions on military officials, while China called for a return to democratic norms but blocked a statement condemning the coup by the UN Security Council. However, no Governments nor the UN have imposed sanctions on the Tatmadaw's biggest resources of income, oil and natural gas. Furthermore, since the UN Security Council did not enforce a sanction on weapons supply, Russia, Serbia, and China support weapons to keep flowing freely into Myanmar, (Myanmar: Coup.., 2022; Stop weapons.., 2022). Considering these facts, it makes one ponder, can the international community claim that they want democracy and human rights laws to be followed? Unfortunately, it seems obvious that there is a repeating cycle, where human rights and democracy are only really important if it has geopolitical effects, first and foremost, if it is affecting the international political economy.

Three months after the official start of the Lebanese uprising, the (OHCHR), called for all

actors in Lebanon to de-escalate the situation. Meanwhile, the International Support Group containing among others, the UN, China, the EU, Russia, the LAS, and the US, mentioned their concern regarding the ineffectiveness of the Lebanese government (Lebanon: UN.., 2020). The international community guaranteed to aid Lebanon's government on the condition of political reforms. However, this is easier said than done since it would further require a change by the international community vis-à-vis their role regarding Lebanon. Lebanese politics are strongly influenced by outside actors, such as Syria, Israel, Saudi Arabia, and Iran. Furthermore, the international community has moved away from encouraging policies for democracy and rather moved towards stabilization processes through power-sharing. After the Beirut port blast, the international community refrained from imposing political reforms and promised to reestablish funding in the name of humanitarian relief and reconstruction (Fakhoury, 2020). Two years later, Antonio Guterres urged the Lebanese political elite to acknowledge the demands of the people, implement political reforms, and start formal negotiations with the IMF. However, he also urged the international community to continue to fund the Lebanese military, for the sake of security (Chehayeb, 2021b). Though it has been concluded by Amnesty and Human Rights Watch that the Lebanese military has been using excessive force since the beginning of the October uprising, the international community such as the EU, France, the US, Saudi Arabia, and the UK have continued to send aid and assistance to the Lebanese police and military (World Report 2021:.., 2021).

Comparing the three countries in terms of how the international community has reacted, there is in some instances a similarity and in other instances a substantial differentiation. In regards to both Sudan and Myanmar, the international community has had similar rhetoric, condemning the military coups, whereas in the case of Lebanon the international community has stated concerns about the situation at hand. Furthermore, Sudan was suspended from the AU and international aid was withdrawn, whereas in Myanmar the consequences were rather aimed at specific people, moreover, the ASEAN did not suspend Myanmar as a country but did exclude General Hlaing from the ASEAN summit. Concerning Lebanon the international community claimed that they would give aid to the country but only on the condition that political reforms took place. However, the international community quickly went back on their conditions after the Beirut port blast, consequently sending Lebanon aid without any conditions. Both Sudan and Lebanon are being further pressured by the international community to handle their national issues through the concept of power-sharing, which can

be said to encourage polarization and undermine democracy. Additionally, both the Myanmarese and the Lebanese military have continued to be supported either through weapons or through funding by different parts of the international community, which undermines the civilian people and the nonviolent movements.

6.7. Geopolitics

Now, this leads one to ponder upon the question of geopolitics, namely if the international community acts to strengthen what is claimed to be international laws and understandings, such as human rights and democracy, or if they acting according to their own needs in a neverending power struggle. All three countries, Sudan, Myanmar, and Lebanon can be seen as geopolitically important in the struggle between international superpowers. In Sudan, the international power struggle seems to be primarily between the US and Russia, where too much pressure of some sort might be enough for the Sudanese power elite to rather work with the opposite side, hence, seemingly making the international community reluctant to act too much. In Myanmar, it is evident that both Russia and China are the main distributors of weapons to the Tatmadaw, this might lead to the conviction that the rest of the international community would rather not put too much pressure on the military to not create too severe consequences with either Russia or China. Considering Lebanon, it important to keep in mind that Lebanon is riddled with geopolitics, such as the complicated and all-encompassing Saudi-Iranian geopolitical conflict, which further brings in actors such as Israel, the US, and Syria in a complicated potpourri (Malmvig & Fakhoury, 2021). Geopolitically speaking, Saudi Arabia is pushing Lebanon to take a side between the Saudi Kingdom and Hezbollah meaning Iran. Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia is also encouraging Israel to make a move against Hezbollah, creating a sort of proxy situation which might ultimately set off yet another war in the Middle East.

While it is widely known that social and political instability bring a huge amounts of negative effects both nationally and to a certain degree internationally, such as economic decline. One can also reflect upon what advantages it might have for international organizations such as the IMF, and the political affiliations to each regime. The IMF has a history of putting economic and political conditions on the aid that is given to a country, so when looking back at countries where this has been implemented one can contemplate the efficiency and whether it is a good idé to try to implement a blueprint on how countries

should manage their economy and politics. Furthermore, one needs to keep in mind that during all violent conflicts or violent repression by a regime, there is significant use of weapons of different sorts, these are generally speaking not being produced by the country or regime using them, which leads to the conclusion that someone within the international community is making money due to the violent instability. All this considering, it appears obvious that geopolitical factors trump human rights and democracy.

6.8. Collective memory

The Sudanese resistance movement seems to have taken into account what their history has shown about nonviolent resistance. First of all, nonviolent resistance can take down a dictator! Secondly, do not take for granted that this means that the end goal has been achieved. Both in 1964 and 1985 the Sudanese people were able to take down military dictators by using nonviolent methods, unfortunately, in both cases, the later consequences were the same, economic crisis, corruption, tumultuous political disagreement, war, and eventually a new military coup and yet another dictator. So when the nonviolent resistance movement in 2019 managed to remove the autocratic President al-Bashir, one of the goals was met, but this time around the Sudanese resistance movement seems to agree that the struggle is not over until the end goal has been reached, which for the Sudanese protesters appears to be democracy and a civilian government without military interference.

Whereas, the Myanmarese, regrettably, has a somber history of nonviolent resistance movements. Where the Tatmadaw have repeatedly brutally shot at nonviolent pro-democracy protesters; they are hence, notoriously known for eliminating nonviolent resistance movements as soon as they emerge (Goldman, 2022). This has most certainly affected the collective memory to use a variety of different methods that might be less dangerous for the protester, meanwhile one can assume that it also decreases the faith in the practice of nonviolence and increases the acceptance of violent flanks.

Even after the end of the Lebanese civil war, violence has been a recurring influence in Lebanese contemporary history. The Cedar Revolution in 2005 in Lebanon did come with success regarding the withdrawal of the Syrian military troops and can be seen as one of the most successful recent nonviolent resistance movements in Lebanon. The uprisings that would follow up until 2019 have been riddled with a lack of unity and the lack of true

change, even though some smaller changes might have been done, the country has seen sectarianism grip a stronger hold of power. Furthermore, in Lebanon, the consequences of a struggle, whether violent or nonviolent, seem to have the same outcome, a reliance on power-sharing, which ultimately does not bring much social change.

Chenoweth mentions the factor of collective memory only in passing. When comparing the three countries Sudan, Myanmar and Lebanon there appears to be an obvious repetition in their track history. In Sudan there have been mostly positive outcomes, even if these may not have been perfect, history appears to have brought a positive collective memory towards nonviolent resistance with a strong belief and faith that these make a difference. In both Myanmar and Lebanon, on the other hand, the history is very different and it seems like the collective memory may be more negative, instead of believing and having faith in the power of nonviolent resistance, the collective memory appears to rather (consciously or unconsciously) emphasize the understanding that nonviolent resistance movements will be brutally squashed, which might be a reason to the current outcome of tolerating violent flanks and skewing away from nonviolent resistance.

Considering Chenoweth's factors regarding the three cases, table 6.1 presents Sudan as the case with the best trajectory to achieve success through nonviolence. However, the international community might be part of the reason why the movement has not achieved victory so far, which can also be said about the other two cases. However, when looking into Myanmar and Lebanon the trajectory looks more somber. The fact that Myanmar has tolerated violent flanks moves the movement away from nonviolence and pushes the country into a path of civil war. In Lebanon, on the other hand, there appears to be little hope for the moment since the movement appears to be fading away.

Table 6.1. Review of case studies in relation to Chenoweth's framework

Green indicates positive outcomes, whereas red indicates negative outcomes in regards to Chenoweth's factors for success.

Sudan	Myanmar	Lebanon
More than	More than	More than
100,000 / Yes	100,000 / Yes	1,000,000 / Yes
No	Yes	No
Yes	Yes	Yes
Yes	No	No
Sudan	Myanmar	Lebanon
No	No	Yes
No	No	Yes
Barbarous military	Savage military	Severe military
repression.	repression.	repression.
No shown tolerance	Tolerate violent	Exhibit violent
to violent flanks	flanks	flanks
Condemned the	Condemned the	Call to de-escalate
coup. Pushing for	coup. Sanctions on	the situation.
	specific individuals.	Pushing for
	U 1	power-sharing.
assistance.	the military.	Funding the military.
Positive	Negative	Negative
	More than 100,000 / Yes No Yes Yes Sudan No No No Sabarous military repression. No shown tolerance to violent flanks Condemned the coup. Pushing for power-sharing. Paused development assistance.	More than 100,000 / YesMore than 100,000 / YesNoYesYesYesYesNoSudanMyanmarNoNoSudanNoNoNoSudanSavage military repression.NoSouge military repression.No shown tolerance to violent flanksTolerate violent flanksCondemned the coup. Pushing for power-sharing.Condemned the coup. Sanctions on specific individuals. Selling weapons to the military.

7. Evaluation of Chenoweth's framework

In applying Chenoweth's framework to the three case studies, several flaws appeared. Chenoweth states that for a nonviolent resistance movement to be considered a success the movement must achieve its goals within a year of the peak of activities. However, since nonviolent resistance movements can very well be occurring non-visibly, and further start by planning and laying the groundwork before they ever become visible, it is, therefore, difficult to determine when a movement starts. To simply say that it is from the point of visibility undermines the groundwork and time that is put into a nonviolent resistance movement. Furthermore, Chenoweth what regards the "peak" of a movement, whether this refers to either a peak of visibility or a peak in numbers of participants, it undermines the nonviolent movement, since both methods and participants may very well not be visible. Moreover, Chenoweth does not explain why she puts a delimitation to just one year from the peak of the movement when concluding the success for said movement.

Furthermore, to be a success according to Chenoweth a nonviolent resistance movement needs to achieve a palpable effect on the outcomes as a direct consequence of the nonviolent resistance movement. Moreover, as explained in the framework, Chenoweth and Stephan were conducting their research on nonviolent resistance movements that had maximalist goals. Considering that maximalist goals are pretty substantial, the "palpable effect" appears to be very vague in comparison. It is further important to state that the so-called end goal rarely is to only overthrow a government but rather to change the dynamic at hand, to reach the point that comes after the achievement of defeating the regime, such as implementing democracy. Therefore, it appears wrong to claim that a movement has succeeded if the government has been toppled but then gone back to its original or similar status as before the nonviolent resistance movement.

Moreover, in 2021 Chenoweth points out that participation is one of the most important key factors, and further states that these are concluded by counting the highest number of participants in the peak of events of a campaign. However, how are these counted and by whom? Furthermore, if they are counted by 'snap photos' of demonstrators then it is further important to take into consideration that these are most likely not all the participants of the

actual movement.

In 2011, Chenoweth and Stephan emphasized defection specifically within military forces. However, this does not necessarily take into consideration the different consequences for nonviolent resistance movements that want to topple a military regime. Furthermore, the Apartheid resistance movement in South Africa showed that achieving loyalty shifts within the economic elite was a humongous factor for their success. Considering that fact, it appears apparent that the pillars of support differ for each country and situation. Additionally, one would argue that loyalty shifts or defection are more of a consequence of other factors rather than a factor in itself since it appears obvious that once the pillars of support are gone, there is no other option for the regime but to surrender to the will of the people. The counterargument to this might be that the regime can receive support from external actors. However, that often means that the regime in a way has to give something back, such as part of the economic or political power, which eventually leads the regime down a road that will be hard to maintain.

The fourth factor according to Chenoweth is resilience which refers to the ability of nonviolent resistance movements to maintain collective action despite actions aimed to curb and prevent said actors by its opponents. In other words to maintain participation, resources, and the ability to switch up the tactics in the face of repression. Considering this, one could claim that resilience is part of the factors of participation and mixed methods. Since it appears obvious and understood that there will most likely be some kind of repression against a nonviolent resistance movement, one could assume that it has been taken into consideration when deciding to take part in the nonviolent resistance movement. Furthermore, when discussing methods, different types of repression are taken into account and are thought through to determine what methods should be used in a certain time and situation, hence, resilience is part of the actual planned strategy in accordance with methods.

In Chenoweths' framework, there are additional factors that may hinder or facilitate the success of a nonviolent resistance movement. One of these is referred to as the international community where the emphasis is put on the withdrawal of support and the mentioning of sanctions. In regards to the three studied cases, sanctions on weapons or an end on funding the military would most like help the movements tremendously. One could argue that the international community is not genuinely out to enhance human rights and democracy but


rather promoting their agenda which may be unrelated to human rights and democracy. However, Chenoweth stays clear of the aspect of geopolitics, which when viewing the globalized world we live in and further studying international social science is apparent to be a decisive factor in most situations around the world. Issues are rarely just on a national level but are always much more complicated than that.

Another additional factor of Chenoweths' framework is the fleet mention of the collective memory, which when studying the three cases within this thesis appears to be a factor that is quite understated by Chenoweth. It seems relatively clear that history tends to repeat itself and that the collective memory does appear to play a significant role in the future outcome and/or the strategy of the nonviolent resistance movement.

Finally, the additional factor referred to as 'smart repression' by Chenoweth, this is not explained as to why she has named it 'smart repression' in the first place. Chenoweth alludes to it as being something new but does not elaborate on how she has drawn that conclusion. This kind of repression has been ongoing for as long as there have been uprisings, so there seems to be an overstatement that this now has changed or intensified the effect on the outcome of nonviolent resistance movements. Further, Chenoweth states that regimes are learning and adapting, which appears to be an embellishment since this is a normal projection that all kinds of governments, movements, and humans do. They study what has been done around them to predict what has worked or not worked in various situations and contexts, and then use that to adapt their strategies and ways. The concept of 'smart repression' considering all this does then appear to be flawed. With that said it does not mean that repression in itself may not be a hindering factor, but rather that there is nothing new under the sun and that the statement that repression may be a reason for the decline in effectiveness appears to be inadequate.

Considering all of this it is clear that Chenoweth's framework is useful in terms of understanding the power of nonviolent resistance movements and the importance of participation and mixed methods to further achieve defection. However, it appears less convincing when discussing the international community, the collective memory, and "smart repression". Furthermore, Chenoweth leaves out aspects that this study has shown to be important, namely geopolitics. Therefore, I propose a new model, presented in figure 7.1 below, as the basis for future evaluations of the success and failures of nonviolent resistance movements. In this model, geopolitics is a completely new factor, whereas, international community and collective memory were mentioned by Chenoweth before, although these factors were not given the importance that they have been found to have for the cases in this study.

Figure 7.1. Extended Model



8. Conclusion

When examining the three chosen cases and comparing them with the terms of Chenoweth's framework it appears as if Sudan is making the most progress and has the best outcome for achieving not just the goal to overthrow the regime but to create substantial change for the future. In the case of Myanmar, it appears that the nonviolent movement has shifted towards a constructive resistance, that in this case, unfortunately, is not a nonviolent one but is rather pushing Myanmar towards what is looking like a new civil war. Lebanon, on the other hand,

has had the least favorable outcomes regarding the terms of Chenoweth's framework. However, at the time of writing, Lebanon has just held an election, which has surprisingly pushed Hezbollah to the backseat. However, sectarianism is still strong and the elections have not changed the political system that the Lebanese people have been demanding, which might be impossible as long as geopolitics has such a stronghold in Lebanon.

In regards to Chenoweth's framework, it is obvious why Chenoweth is the guru of today in regards to the topic of nonviolent resistance movements. Her study provides a base for both nonviolent movements and future researchers. However, this study finds that to understand more recent nonviolent social protests and what they need to succeed, Chenoweth's framework fails to emphasize the importance of international support. Which is important for us to understand how we can truly help and enhance the success of nonviolent movements. Furthermore, her framework fails to take into account the fact that we live in a very globalized world and, hence, misses the importance and consequences of geopolitical aspects concerning nonviolent resistance movements.

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